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Abstract:
This article tracks the many appearances of Friedrich Nietzsche throughout
the history of cinema. It asks how cinema can do Nietzschean philosophy in ways
that are unique to the medium. It also asks why the cinematic medium might
be so pertinent to Nietzschean philosophy. Adhering to the implicit premise
that, as Jacques Derrida once put it, ‘ there is no totality to Nietzsche’s text, not even
a fragmentary or aphoristic one, ’ the essay’s mode of argument avoids reductive
totalization and instead comprises a playful sampling of variously Nietzschean
manifestations across dissimilar films. It begins with an extended account of
Baby Face, a 1933 drama from which the abundant references to Nietzsche
were either altered or expunged ahead of theatrical release. It then maps some
of the philosophical consistencies across two genres in which characters read
Nietzsche with apparent frequency: the comedy and the thriller. While comedies
and thrillers both treat Nietzsche and his readers with suspicion, and do so for
perceptive historical reasons, the essay then asks what an affirmatively Nietzschean
film might look like. It explores this possibility through a discussion of cinematic
animation in general and then more specifically via several critically familiar films
that self-consciously evolve their aesthetic through Nietzsche’s philosophy. The
essay concludes by affirming Be´la Tarr’s final film as one of the medium’s greatest
realizations of a Nietzschean film-philosophy. The Turin Horse, released in 2011,
is exemplary because it takes Nietzsche as a narrative premise only to sublate
that premise into a unique visual style.
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Lily Powers: The First Overwoman
Our story begins in Erie, Pennsylvania, during the Prohibition. A young
woman, Lily Powers, works tables at her father’s speakeasy, where she
is pimped out to the male clientele and the police inspectors. When
an exploding still kills her father she is advised by an old friend to hop
a freight train for New York City. Having arrived, Lily sleeps her way to
the top of Gotham Trust, a conglomerate bank modelled clearly on that
of J. P. Morgan. She advances up the ranks from the filing department,
into mortgages, and into accounting, until an affair with Ned Stevens – a
young executive engaged to the daughter of the bank’s first vice president,
J. P. Carter – nearly sees her out of a job. But she seduces J. P., who
then installs her in a lavish apartment until masculine jealousy for Lily’s
affection leads to a murder and then a suicide. Stevens shoots his potential
father-in-law, Carter, and then turns the gun on himself. With grim
resolve, Lily engineers a clean break from these entanglements by playing
the victim and using her now scandalous diary to blackmail the firm into
sending her to France. Having established herself in Paris, Lily becomes
the focus of at least one more banker’s desire and affection. Courtland
Trenholm, an ex-playboy appointed to amend the bank’s mismanagement,
is likewise seduced and soon marries Lily. But, when she refuses to
provide a seven-figure bailout for Gotham Trust, he also attempts suicide.
The story ends with his and her fate left uncertain.
This fable of anti-capitalist sabotage through female sexuality should
be familiar to pre-Code film enthusiasts, for it is the plot of Baby Face,
a 1933 sex romp directed by Alfred E. Green and staring a young Barbara
Stanwyck as Lily. This film gives exceptionally powerful voice to what
Gwendolyn Audrey Foster describes as ‘ the trauma implicit in the
modernist paradigm, a trauma steeped in economic strife, classism,
sexism, ageism, and the perils of class-passing, set against the two-sided
backdrop of squalor versus luxury and glamor ’ (2006, p. 100). More
infamously, however, it was also instrumental for the introduction of the
Hays Code, despite having been subject to multiple censorious edits.
Indeed, numerous sexually suggestive moments had already been replaced
by the scarcely sanitizing visual metaphor of a tilt-shot looking up the
shaft of an office tower accompanied by that smuttiest of all soundtrack
instruments: a tenor saxophone, jamming out on the ‘Saint Louis Blues. ’
Though it has always been easy enough to sublimate sex into the visual
grammar of film – which is resoundingly evident with those saxophonous
tilt-shots – what remains unique to this film’s censorship is the wholesale
removal of Lily Powers’ motivations. Specifically, this film provides a rare
instance in which we encounter the excision not only of a character’s
apparently deplorable actions but also of their guiding philosophy.
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One vital scene, which takes place immediately after the funeral for
Lily’s abusive father and just before she hightails it to the city, was altered
prior to release. It opens with an extreme close-up on the creased spine
of a leather-bound book held vertically before the camera. Everything
but the book is blurred. The name of the author and the title of the tome
are unmistakably clear. In capital letters, beneath a horizontal line, and
reading almost luminously against the greys and blacks behind them:
NIETZSCHE and an inch below that WILL TO POWER. The book is a
collection of Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, edited together and released
posthumously by his sister, Elisabeth. Rather than have the camera pull
back it holds still and the book is lowered away, rotated leftward, and
opened. Cut to a new shot. The reader is Lily’s friend, the cobbler, framed
side-on as he smokes a pipe and flips through the book’s pages. He looks
like its author. The camera arcs left just as Lily enters the room, so as
to capture her face with an over-the-shoulder shot when she sits in front
of her friend, looking up at him. The framing and the blocking are as
important as the dialogue. They suggest an imbalance of power worked
out along the lines of gender, with the self-assuredly learned man looking
down on the apparently hapless woman, but it is an imbalance that the
actors’ performance will swiftly and impressively overturn.
‘So, ’ she says, ‘ that’s that. ’ The two discuss her frankly miserable
prospects in Erie before the cobbler, in a thick German accent, chides
her as an unmotivated coward and then shouts through an exhortative
monologue, which in the uncensored version includes these words:
A woman young, beautiful like you can get anything she wants in the world,
because you have power over men. But you must use men, not let them use
you. You must be a master, not a slave. Look! Here! Nietzsche says: ‘All life,
no matter how we idealize it, is nothing more nor less than exploitation. ’
That’s what I’m telling you! Exploit yourself! Go to some big city where you
will find opportunities! Use men! Be strong! Defiant! Use men – to get the
things you want!
Though the speech’s delivery features shots from multiple perspectives, its
conclusion returns us to where it began, with the camera tilted downward
over the cobbler’s shoulder, framing Lily as the more diminutive of the
pair. The apparent slave to his master. There is a long and pensive pause in
which she looks down and back up again without moving anything but
her eyes. Then just one syllable, pronounced slowly. ‘Yeah, ’ says Lily. We
can just about feel the weight of her utterance. She lifts a cigarette, takes a
drag, and gently exhales. Stillness and lucidity in the face of evangelism.
The shot fades into the next scene with an image of a steam-train as
though it too is going up in a billow of smoke – as though the totality of
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the film is determinately responsive to the force of one character’s gesture.
Stanwyck’s screen charisma shines through here; it is at precisely this
moment that our heroine attains to an indescribable yet signature coolness
that elevates her status beyond the narrative frame, as well as making her
by far the more commanding presence of the pair depicted in this shot.
With such an effortlessly scene-stealing performance, which completely
inverts the power imbalance encoded by the framing and the blocking and
the dialogue, the film itself enacts precisely what one of its characters has
just been preaching. Here Nietzsche’s philosophy shapes visual style no
less than explicit narrative content.
Lily Powers’ name thus takes on the force of nominal determinism. As
this early scene makes perfectly clear, hers is a fully realized will to power:
der Wille zur Macht. Her subsequent quest is motivated by what Nietzsche
would describe as the abolition of a sentimental human self and the new
being’s simultaneous creation of the world in its own image. ‘Exploitation, ’
claims Nietzsche, ‘does not belong to a corrupted or imperfect, primitive
society: it belongs to the essence of being alive as a fundamental organic
function; it is a result of genuine will to power, which is just the will of life ’
(2002, p. 153). By exploiting her own sexuality and that of her devotees,
Lily makes herself into Hollywood’s first self-conscious representation of
the Nietzschean superhuman. But without this opening dialogue that
inauguration might have gone unrecognized. In the theatrical cut, nothing
is said of slaves and masters, or of the will to power, and instead the
cobbler’s speech refers precisely to the moral economy that Nietzsche’s
philosophy sought to overturn. ‘But there is a right way and a wrong way, ’
he cautions Lily on her pursuit of autonomy. ‘Remember, the price of the
wrong way is too great. ’ In the theatrical version, by way of contrast to the
original cut, the cobbler’s speech incongruously submits the will to power
to moral judgment. ‘Be clean, be strong, defiant, and you will be a success. ’
Hollywood was not so far beyond good and evil after all.
This early scene is not the only one that was tampered with
or eliminated for theatrical release. In the restored film, Lily continues
to study Nietzsche and uses his philosophy as a guide for life in
moments of crisis. Immediately before she causes and is witness to the
climactic murder-suicide, a package arrives sent by the cobbler: a copy of
Nietzsche’s Thoughts out of Season, which has since been retranslated
under the more familiar title Untimely Mediations. Lily’s reading repeats
the shot from earlier, looking closely at the book’s spine before opening its
pages. The film gives us an extreme close-up on the text. There are three
paragraphs on screen, but the middle one is lit brighter, is free of optical
distortion, and is bracketed off by the cobbler’s hand-inked annotation.
‘Face life as you find it, ’ we read with Lily, ‘defiantly and unafraid. Waste
Film-Philosophy 21 (2017)
98
no energy yearning for the moon. Crush all sentiment. ’ This too was cut
from the released film. But more dramatic than the book’s elision is that
the film itself indulges the very ideology that inspired such an edit.
Specifically, a tacked-on ending, in which Lily begins to contemplate
bailing out the bank and saving her moribund husband, seems a pre-
emptive effort to make the film more palatable. Indeed, it reframes Lily as
an affectionately submissive woman and it does so through what feels like
unmerited sentimentalism. Jeanine Basinger describes it with sufficient
incredulity: ‘Throughout this film, there has been no indication that
Stanwyck is the woman she becomes in the final five minutes ’ (quoted in
Foster, 2006, p. 101). And so it is that Lily’s unique tale is unsuccessfully
folded back into the cultural logics of domesticity and the financial
imperatives of the market. 1930s Hollywood just couldn’t handle the
philosophical overman, let alone the unashamedly promiscuous
overwoman. Nietzsche’s time had not yet come.
The Bathos of Philosophy Bros.
‘But I want to expose your hiding places to the light; therefore I laugh into
your face my laughter of the heights ’ (2006, p. 76). So quips Zarathustra,
fuming against the prophets of so-called equality. Nietzsche similarly
promotes his own philosophical method, die fro¨hliche wissenschaf or the
gay science. ‘Perhaps laughter, ’ he writes, ‘will then have formed an
alliance with wisdom; perhaps only “gay science” will remain’ (2001,
pp. 27–28). If, as John Lippitt is right to insist, Nietzsche “awards laughter
a status higher than that granted by any other philosopher” (1992, p. 39),
that could be why the majority of his filmic cameos are from comedy,
the cinematic mode or genre most preoccupied with laughter. Here books
written by Nietzsche serve a specific purpose. They appear and reappear
as symbolically charged props included primarily to satirize typically
male readers. Indeed, the satire is caused by the failure of men to embrace
their wills to power and enter the ranks of the prophesied u¨bermenschen.
To read Nietzsche here is to have one’s character mired in a laughable
bathos – and, in the following three films, that bathos serves consistently
as a force of vituperative emasculation. Perhaps this is why the laughter
habitually emanates from a feminized perspective.
A Fish Called Wanda (John Cleese and Charles Crichton, 1988) gives
us one of cinema’s great comedy villains in the figure of Otto West, an
arms-dealer and hitman played by a moustachioed Kevin Kline. In his
own mind, this ex-CIA psychopath is a man of learning and wisdom,
an awe-inspiring intellectual, and in this capacity he promotes the
idea of himself as a disciple of Nietzsche. Our introduction to Otto in
the film’s opening minutes sees him fallen asleep with a ludicrously
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oversized paperback print of Beyond Good and Evil spread across his
chest. An alarm rings, Otto shoots it with a silenced pistol, takes a
second to gather his thoughts, then returns to reading. This brief episode
perfectly encapsulates the dichotomy of Otto’s personality, which shuttles
schizophrenically between intellectual pretension and explosive
violence, with the latter invariably eclipsing the former. In short:
despite his aspirations to intellectual authority, Otto is exceedingly and
overwhelmingly stupid. On this point, Otto’s increasingly estranged lover,
played by Jamie Lee Curtis, delivers a deeply cutting excoriation.
OTTO: Don’t call me stupid.
WANDA: Oh, right! To call you stupid would be an insult to stupid people!
I’ve known sheep that could outwit you. I’ve worn dresses with higher IQs.
But you think you’re an intellectual, don’t you, ape?
OTTO: Apes don’t read philosophy.
WANDA: Yes they do, Otto. They just don’t understand it.
This is more than just a criticism of Otto’s pretentious reading habits.
More pointedly, it is a criticism sourced in Otto’s reading materials. ‘What
is the ape to man?’ asks Zarathusta. ‘A laughing stock or a painful
embarrassment. And that is precisely what the human shall be to the
overman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment ’ (2006, p. 6). Otto
is, despite all his efforts to the contrary, a source of dim-witted hilarity.
That his lover knows this and that she knows it on the terms set by Otto’s
intellectual idol is what makes the exchange so cutting. It’s also what
makes their dialogue so hilarious.
In Clueless (1995), Amy Heckerling’s mock-up of Jane Austen’s Emma,
Josh Lucas is the stepbrother and eventual romantic interest of the
teenaged socialite Cher. When he returns from college to the ultra-affluent
Beverly Hills his stepsister finds him pouring over Nietzsche’s collected
works. Here, the college student’s sartorial nihilism – black shirt, black
jacket, black shades – is undercut by the poolside setting in Beverly Hills.
Josh reclines on a sunlounge before a wall of cascading fountains.
Everything about the setting screams bourgeois decadence. While the shot
zooms in on Josh, Alicia Silverstone’s Cher speaks on the soundtrack.
‘A licensed driver with nothing to do. Where would I find such a loser? ’
Cher punctually appears over the apparent loser’s left shoulder, with
both of their faces framed in union by the open book.
CHER: Hey, granola breath, you got something on your chin.
JOSH: I’m growing a goatee.
CHER: Well that’s good. You don’t want to be the last one at the coffee house
without chin pubes.
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Their physical proximity and the dialogic frisson together encode
something of the quasi-incestuous agon that will eventually blossom into
romance. And while that romance is only enabled by a shift in the
perceptions of intellectual capital – when Cher turns out to be much
cleverer than anyone suspected – here that shift is working in the opposite
direction, via the stripping down of Josh’s intellectual pretension. Just
imagine what the philosopher would have made of this. In fact, Nietzsche
once wrote about a comparable setting. ‘At the sight of a waterfall we think
we see in the countless curvings, twistings and breakings of the waves
capriciousness and freedom of will; but everything here is necessary, every
motion mathematically calculable ’ (1996, p. 57). As Cher so clearly knows:
Josh is nothing but a cliche´, the living capitulation to a preordained
lifestyle: a coffee house intellectual or klatch philosopher. The poolside
setting with its manufactured waterfall only accentuates this truth.
And finally, in Little Miss Sunshine (Jonathan Dayton and Valerie Faris,
2006) the maudlin Dwayne Hoover is committed to a vow of silence in
teenage rebellion against his thoroughly dysfunctional family. Surely it is
not without significance that Dwayne is played by the most resplendently
ineffectual of all working actors, namely Paul Dano. His character in
this film is the very embodiment of adolescent impotence: from the way he
slouches from scene to scene, through the vacantly slack-jawed expression
he wears at almost all times, right down to the mop of dyed-black hair.
That Dwayne and his vow of silence are shaped by Nietzsche is suggested
by the character’s introduction, in which the scrawny teenager lifts
a barbell, skips, and performs crunches, push-ups, and chin-ups all
under the watchful eyes of the philosopher, whose roughly painted visage
decorates one wall of Dwayne’s bedroom. The next time we see Dwayne he
is reading a Penguin Classics edition of Zarathustra, a book profoundly
and paradoxically interested in silence. ‘ It is my favourite malice and art
that my silence has learned not to betray itself through silence, ’ claims
the eponymous prophet. And silence is, for Nietzsche, a defensive gesture
used to shore up the will against its potential assailants. ‘To prevent
anyone from looking down into my ground and ultimate will, I invented
my long bright silence ’ (2006, p. 139). The suggestion of Nietzschean
influence is soon confirmed through a conversation with his uncle, Frank,
the despairing Proust scholar played with abundant warmth by Steve
Carell. Frank, sitting on a cot in Dwayne’s bedroom, asks why his nephew
refuses to speak. ‘You can talk you just choose not to? ’ Dwayne replies by
looking left and pointing. The camera pans from Frank’s perspective to
focus on the painting of Nietzsche. Black brushstrokes make up eyebrows,
nose, and moustache. ‘ Is that Nietzsche? ’ Frank condescends, gently.
‘You don’t speak because of Friedrich Nietzsche. ’ Dwayne drops his head
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and shuffles off down the hallway. There is nothing malicious or bright
about this gesture. It feels weak and comes across as petulant at best.
Another emasculation, this time performed not by the woman but instead
the effeminate uncle.
Imperfect Crimes and Criminal Hubris
If, under the sign of comedy, books written by Nietzsche appear as
satirical props designed to emasculate their readers, in other genres we
encounter characters that claim to live according to Nietzsche – to have
read, internalized, and embodied his philosophy – and with alarming
recidivism these characters find themselves slaked in blood and mired
with death. The popular conception of Nietzsche as synonymous with
terror and violence reaches something like its cinematic apotheosis in any
number of action films, but especially in Conan the Barbarian (John Milius,
1982), an ultra-violent sword-and-sandals blockbuster that served
amongst other things to provide the breakthrough role for Arnold
Schwarzenegger. This film opens with an epigraph attributed to Nietzsche.
‘That which does not kill us makes us stronger – Friedrich Nietzsche, ’
reads text made up of what appears to be molten steel. Revealingly, these
words do not belong to Nietzsche – who coined the phrase ‘what does
not kill me makes me stronger ’ (2005, p. 157) – but, rather, they are
from a paraphrase by G. Gordon Liddy, assistant to Richard Nixon. While
this Reagan-era epic champions the full-blooded rage of an Aryan
superman (against black antagonists, no less) the rampant conservatism
encoded therein only echoes for an American audience the openly fascist
interpretation of Nietzsche promoted by its German precursors.
Writing against the historical subsumption of Nietzsche into Hitler’s
ideological apparatus, George Bataille offers the clearest warning against
reductive misinterpretations of Nietzschean philosophy. ‘Were it not
for the habitual jeering at Nietzsche, ’ he argues, ‘ the transforming of
Nietzsche into what most depressed him (a rapid reading, a facile use,
made without even rejecting positions inimical to him), his doctrine would
be grasped for what it is: the fiercest of solvents ’ (1997, p. 334). This is
why, despite their titular invocations of the will, no film by Leni Riefenstahl
should ever be considered properly Nietzschean, for Riefenstahl’s
propaganda isolates certain ideas and promotes them with little regard
for the contradictory whole of Nietzsche’s philosophy. By allying
themselves with the Nazi death cult these films neglect that a will to
power is first and foremost a will to life. ‘To make him the collaborator in
causes devalorized by his thought, ’ insists Bataille, ‘ is to trample upon it, to
prove one’s ignorance even as one pretends to care for that thought ’ (1997,
p. 334). While action films and propaganda reels might be guilty of turning
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Nietzsche against himself to produce a philosophy of terror, it is this very
interpretation and the threat it conveys to which cinematic thrillers are
intensely alive. Specifically, to read Nietzsche in a thriller is to promote an
awareness of the violence that obtains within an ultimately hubristic
interpretation – one whose interpreters claim to have closed the gap
between their human selves and their superhuman ideals.
Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope (1948) has its factual basis in real events.
In May 1924 two students at the University of Chicago – Nathan Leopold
and Richard Loeb – kidnapped and murdered a fourteen year-old boy,
Robert Franks. Their motivation was a shared delusion of having attained
the status of u¨bermenschen, men whose transcendent superiority was
believed to exempt them from the laws and rules that bind the human
populace. In Hitchcock’s film, an affluent homosexual couple strangle a
former classmate in their Manhattan apartment. They conceal his body
in a chest, which is then used as the centrepiece for a dinner party whose
guests include their victim’s closest acquaintances. Adapted from a book
with the same title and loosely based on the Leopold and Loeb case,
the film makes clear that the two murderers, Brandon and Phillip, are
taking their cues from a reading of Nietzsche. As with Leopold and Loeb,
Brandon and Phillip’s intent is to demonstrate their stature as overmen
by committing the perfect murder. They believe that murder, for the man
of superior intellect and culture, is not a crime but an art. So Brandon
explains to his guests in what might be described as a confession without
content, for only Phillip is aware of the act to which these words refer.
‘Good and evil and right and wrong were invented for the ordinary,
average man – the inferior man – because they need them. ’ These weakly
performed ideas are a second-hand reading of Nietzsche inherited without
question from Rupert Cadell – played by James Stewart – who was once
the prep-school housemaster of both the murderers and their victim. It is
only after the party, when Brandon and Phillip prepare to dispose of the
body, that Cadell returns and uses flattery to outwit a confession from
the egomaniacal Brandon.
In his psychoanalytic interpretation of the film, Slavoj Zˇizˇek insists
that we view Rope as a failure because it is unable to fully confront the
horror of its violence, which he rightly insists cannot be separated from
that of the Nazis in Germany. The film’s misguided thesis, he argues, is
that when Rupert is finally ‘confronted with the literal realization of his
doctrine – when, following the Lacanian definition of communication, he
gets back from the other his own message in its inverted, true form – he is
shaken and shrinks back from the consequence of his words, ’ but at this
moment he is unwilling to recognize the murderous deed as the logical
outcome of his teachings (1992, pp. 42–43). The temptation here is to
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align the film itself with Cadell, giving Stewart’s genially eccentric
character the final word on its fictional universe, but instead – and contra
Zˇizˇek – all of this must be appreciated within the formal conceit that
frames it. Famously, Hitchcock set out to shoot the whole of Rope in a
single unbroken long take. While the realization of this ambition would
have been impossible due to unassailable material constraints, not least
of which is the length of film stock and the size of projection reels,
the completed film nevertheless comprises only ten shots joined together
almost seamlessly by surreptitious edits. The formal constraint impresses
not only as a gimmicky obstruction but also because of the serious
demands it places on both the camera and the actors to spatially negotiate
a small, overpopulated, and densely furnished set. The ingenious dexterity
of the camerawork matches the social game performed by Brandon. It is
thus that form and content mutually reflect to produce a recursive vision
of an ultimately flawed exactitude: the imperfect shot for the imperfect
crime. ‘Mankind, ’ claims Zarathustra, ‘ is a rope fastened between animal
and overman – a rope over an abyss ’ (2006, p. 7). With Hitchcock’s flawed
film the rope has frayed and man is given over to his abyssal plummet.
Perhaps it is this easy analogy between form and style, between how
the film is shot and the crypto-fascist designs of its murderers, which
informed Hitchcock’s eventual censure of it as an unforgivable failure.
So he would confess to Franc¸ois Truffaut: ‘ I really don’t know how I came
to indulge in it ’ (1983, p. 179).
Though Rope might be exceptional in its extended treatment and
interrogation of the hubris belonging to self-proclaimed u¨bermenschen,
it is not alone in casting such philosophically deluded characters as
murderers. In television, too, Nietzschean killers run rampant – but this
is to be expected, given that crime thrillers have always preferred a
serial format. Here we can look at two recent televisual exemplars from
either side of the Atlantic. The cosmically gothic first season of True
Detective is more in tune with the outright pessimism of Nietzsche’s
forbear, Arthur Schopenhauer, than with Nietzsche’s own critique of
nihilism. Nevertheless, at key moments its debt to Nietzsche is articulated
through characters’ misinterpretation of eternal recurrence – which, as
in Hitchcock’s film, both leads to atrocity and is used to govern a formal
conceit, in this case the doubling of events between two narrative
temporalities so as to enforce a sense of repetitious cyclicality. In other
words, the narrative is as much eternally recurrent as it is about
the eternal return as a philosophical concept. ‘Someone once told me
time is a flat circle, ’ proclaims Matthew McConaughey’s Rust Cohle.
‘Everything we ever done or will do we gonna do over and over and
over again. ’ Readers of philosophy will assume to know where Cohle
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heard this, for these words echo a familiar simplification of Zarathustra’s
doctrine. But Zarathustra does not utter them. Instead, they are taken from
a dwarf’s interjection during the prophet’s sermon. And, as Zarathustra
reproaches, these words are pure hubris. ‘You spirit of gravity! ’ he barks.
‘Do not make it too easy on yourself! ’ (2006, p. 126). Though Cohle is
very much a nihilist on the order of Zarathustra’s dwarf – at one point
another character calls him ‘little priest ’ – that is not necessarily the
textual origin of Cohle’s paraphrase. Cohle only repeats these words when
recounting an assault on the meth lab run by Reggie Ledoux, a tattoo-
stained pederast and butcher of children. ‘You’ll do this again, ’ drawls
Ledoux into the afternoon sun when captured and held at gunpoint. ‘Time
is a flat circle. ’ To which Cohle replies, pistol cocked: ‘What is that?
Nietzsche? Shut the fuck up. ’ Here, moments before his execution,
Ledoux finds absolution for unspeakable crimes in an appropriation of
Nietzsche’s thought. But naturally enough, the eternal return is a concept
that will recur at least once more in the series, during our introduction to
the story’s true antagonist, the polymath serial murderer Errol Childress.
In his case, however, mass murder is conceived of as a means to escape the
eternal return. It serves as a way out. ‘My ascension, ’ he claims, ‘my
ascension removes me from the disc and the loop. ’
Similarly, cat-and-mouse procedural The Fall features a serial killer
who communicates with the investigating constabulary almost exclusively
through Nietzschean philosophy. After a series of strangulations in Belfast,
Ireland, Metropolitan Police Superintendent Stella Gibson – played by
Gillian Anderson – takes lead of the strained investigation. The murderer,
whom we are made to know from the very start of the series, is
Paul Spector, who by day acts as a bereavement counsellor and family
man. This narrative derives much of its energy from two seemingly
incompatible relationships: between Spector and Gibson, on the one hand,
and between Spector and his family, on the other. It is, however, in the
chiasmic bond between the two relationships that Nietzsche is brought
to fore, specifically in an act of remorse that unites both sides of Spector’s
personality: the pitiless murderer and the caring father. After learning
that a victim was pregnant he composes a letter of apology to her father
including a line from Zarathustra. Gibson, who immediately recognizes
the phrase, has an investigative assistant read from the line’s textual
source. The shortened text, delivered with an in Irish inflection, is this:
I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to
a dancing star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that
is no longer able to despise himself. Behold! I show you the last man. “What
is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” – thus asks the
last man and blinks.
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But Spector is not and cannot be the father of chaos to which he so clearly
aspires, and this is not only because his homicidal obsession runs against
the affirmation of life and neither is it because of his biological gender;
moreover, and so much more prosaically, he cannot give birth to chaos
because of his abiding commitment to domestic and professional order:
he is the superlatively orderly middle-class subject, a despicable ‘ last
man. ’ This fact is made even more obvious by contrast with his opposite
number, Gibson, whose embodiment of the feminist ideal guides her
against both the domestic and professional constraints that bind her
antithesis, and whose manifest will to power leads her to the preservation
and betterment of life as opposed to its extinguishment. Unlike him, she
knows love, creation, and longing. But he fails to recognize this. ‘We’re
very alike, you and me, ’ he tells her over the phone in the first season’s
finale. ‘Both driven by will to power. A desire to control everything and
everyone. Obsessive. Ruthless. Living and breathing moral relativism.
It’s just you’re bound by conventional notions of right and wrong. ’
She fires back a scathing riposte: ‘You’re a slave to your desires. You have
no control at all. You’re weak. Impotent. ’ She sees through misogynistic
egoism and the hubris of recruiting Nietzsche into such a pitiful
worldview. ‘ Is that really why you called me, ’ she asks, ‘ to expound
some half-baked philosophy? ’ Here Nietzsche’s philosophy resides in the
duality of character as its two embodying opposites are drawn together
by the gravitational pull of apotheosis. Yet of course, the philosophical
valence of their antagonism should have been expected all along, given
this story appears to be another case of nominal determinism: his name
suggests only death whereas hers posits an affinity with the stars.
Animal Vigour and the Moving Image
Everything we have encountered so far indicates less a scepticism directed
at Nietzsche’s own views on the will to power, the superhuman, and the
eternal return, and more a critical perspective on Nietzsche’s variously
devout readers: in one genre, satirically emphasizing the aspirational
divide between characters and their ideals; and, in the other, amplifying
the violence that attends a hubristic simplification and over-identification
with Nietzschean doctrine. The question so far has therefore been one
of reception and its subjective activation. The aesthetic intensity and
historical repetition with which this question is posed results primarily
from the philosopher’s unique absorption into popular thought, which
in itself has become a topic of political if not philosophical debate. This
is part of what Alain Badiou is suggesting when he reads Nietzsche
as an ‘anti-philosopher, ’ a figure who ‘opposes, to the speculative nihilism
of philosophy, the completely affirmative necessity of an act, ’ and
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whose achievement is therefore in the lived embodiment of its reception as
opposed to its existence as mere interpretation, analysis, and theory
(2011, p. 1). Exceptionally, Nietzsche’s philosophy wants for reckoning
beyond the philosopher’s tower.
That want, which is given formal and thematic expression
all throughout Nietzsche’s oeuvre, translates into a way of writing about
film that breaks with some of the prevalent academic formulas. If, as is
generally recognized, the two major figures in the film-philosophical turn
are Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, there may well be a tension between
the scholarship informed and inspired by those two and scholarship that
maintains a fidelity to Nietzsche’s ambitions. This is because Cavell and
Deleuze are both systematic thinkers whose writings on cinema tend to
reflect as much, whereas it is precisely against philosophical systems that
Nietzsche implores rebellion. ‘ I distrust all systematizers and avoid them,’
he claims. ‘The will to a system is a lack of integrity ’ (2005, p. 159).
Whether or not we agree with this provocation – though some of the
films we have just seen certainly might – the fact remains that such
distrust clearly underwrote the composition of Nietzsche’s books and
the formation of his project on the whole. Here form and content are
consonant in their ideation. As Jacques Derrida would eventually put
it: ‘ there is no totality to Nietzsche’s text, not even a fragmentary or
aphoristic one’ (1979, p. 135). Nietzsche’s unique style of writing, his
deliberate presentational method, is one that might yet lend itself to an
affirmative mode of film criticism. ‘In the mountains, ’ Zarathustra tells
us, ‘ the shortest way is from peak to peak, but for that one must have
long legs ’ (2006: 28). While the present survey can be fairly accused
of abjuring deep or sustained analysis of any one film, or of avoiding
conventional argumentative structure, that is only because its author
wants film-philosophy to follow Nietzsche, at least for this brief outing,
and enjoy a long-legged dash across the mountaintops – or if not in the
mountains then at least through the multiplex.
And yet, the big question remains unanswered: why should cinematic
narrative be so frequently preoccupied with Nietzsche to begin with?
One reason is that cinema itself might be the privileged medium for
developing a properly Nietzschean aesthetic. If – as D. N. Rodowick
argues after Deleuze – cinema is a singularly well-equipped host of
life-affirming vitality, perhaps this medium will be site for a will to power,
for what Rodowick describes as ‘a blossoming, ascendant life, capable
of transforming itself in cooperation with the forces it encounters,
composing with them an ever growing power, “always increasing
the power to live, always open to new possibilities” ’ (2010, p. 103). Or
perhaps, in its capacity as a popular successor to opera, cinema might even
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fulfil the promise made to a young Nietzsche by Richard Wagner in
Bayreuth: it may well be a form ‘whose problems are abbreviations of the
endlessly complex calculus of human action and desire, ’ a form ‘able to
produce the appearance of a simpler world, a shorter solution to the riddle
of life ’ (1997, p. 213). Tom Cohen once pursued that very argument,
updating Wagner for the age of mechanical reproducibility. ‘Cinema, ’ he
claims, ‘seems heir to the Gesamtkunstwerk whose operatic version was
Nietzsche’s “MacGuffin” or pretext for writing The Birth, particularly if we
replace Kunst with Technik ’ (2009, p. 149). My sense, however, is that all
of this will need some secure basis in the text itself, in Nietzsche’s
philosophy and its written articulation, and there we find at least one
prefiguration of cinematic technology.
In his late notebooks, in an entry written sometime in the autumn
of 1887, Nietzsche offers a superlatively powerful vision of the aesthetic
regime’s potential. He tells us what the artwork is really good for:
Art reminds us of states of animal vigor; it’s on the one hand a surplus and
overflow of flourishing corporeality into the world of images and wishes; on
the other a rousing of the animal function through images and wishes
of intensified life - a heightening of the feeling of life, a stimulus for it.
(2003, p. 160).
One can easily imagine an affirmation of cinema made along these lines:
of film, whose predicate in animation makes it the very art of animal
movement, and whose unique goal is to vitalize the world of images as
its own flourishing corporeality. In this sense, we might suggest that
film is in itself Nietzschean; or, more accurately, that Nietzsche’s vision
of art is pre-cinematic, anachronistically articulating a premonition of the
future technology. If this is true, further questions abound. What might a
Nietzschean film look like? How might a film make good on these aspects
of its own apparatus? Do such films exist? While the examples we
have looked at so far are more interested in the reception of Nietzsche’s
philosophy, numerous other films commit themselves to the construction
and elaboration of a properly Nietzschean vision using the technical
means specific to the medium.
Of course, that vision is what we might expect – to open a
brief parenthesis – from the inhuman formalism of cartoon animation,
either with its hand-drawn cells or its digitally rendered pixels. The
exemplary television series here would be Adventure Time (Pendleton
Ward, 2010), a post-apocalyptic saga set in the magical Land of Ooo. After
the apparent heat death of humankind, characters nevertheless continue
to read Nietzsche: the vermiform students of Worm College attend
classes on ‘Theoretical Fightonomics ’ and speculate on hypothetical duels
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between Nietzsche’s u¨bermensch and the cybernetic Mandroid; and, in
another episode, the Ice King gives existentialism a whole new layer of
meta-resonance by concealing a ‘Nihilism Funnies ’ comic strip within a
much weightier tome, The Lighter Side of Nietzsche. These references
inform a narrative whose heroic duo, Jake the Dog and Finn the Human,
are the manifestly triumphant realizations of Nietzschean spirit. Jake’s
shape-shifting ‘stretchy powers ’ render him animation incarnate, capable
of infinite self-invention. And Finn – the nominally last human in Ooo,
an inveterate man of action – is eventually revealed to be the rebirth of
a sentient comet: he is quite literally Zarathustra’s dancing star. But,
closing this parenthesis almost as soon as it opened, it will not be cartoon
animation but motion capture, either through causal-indexical film
imaging or micro-indexical digitalism, that shall serve as our privileged
medium here. This is because cinema in that more traditional sense is not
just animate but also animates the erstwhile human subject, a figure that,
in Nietzsche’s philosophy, is a necessary stepping stone – a transitory
thing to be overcome on the uncharted path to immortality. So Deleuze
once remarked on Fritz Lang, in such a way that suggests the importance
of motion capture to the present argument: ‘ if the human body enters
directly into these “geometrical groupings,” ’ he argues on the architecture
of expressionism, ‘ it is because all difference between the mechanical
and the human has dissolved, but this time to the advantage of the potent
non-organic life of things ’ (1986, p. 52). Moving away from cartoon
animation and back to motion capture, I want to gesture toward three
well-known films, all of which give form to that inhuman advantage,
before describing the philosophical vocation shared between them.
The most famous film to productively engage Nietzsche is Stanley
Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). At the level of explicit citation
the film’s celebrated opening sequence, in which the sun gradually
illuminates the earth’s curvature, is scored to the thunderous timpani
of Richard Strauss’ musical adaptation of Zarathustra, from which the
film takes its worldview. This is a film whose narrative literalizes the
idea of humankind as a transitory conduit between the ape and some
unknowable, future being: which is eventually revealed as the appallingly
kitsch Star Child. Andrei Tarkovsky’s Sacrifice (Offret, 1986) is about
Alexander, a middle-aged nihilist who in a supreme act of bad faith
attempts to bargain with God to prevent an imminent nuclear holocaust.
The film’s opening long take features a conversation between Alexander
and the postman about the dwarf from part three of Zarathustra, a figure
that famously necessitates the fullest articulation of the eternal return;
and, thereafter, the film stages Alexander’s willful self-transfiguration.
His is an existential journey that reaches its climax in the conflagration
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of an old house, the kind of architectural structure which in almost all of
Tarkovsky’s late-career films serves as an emblem of the past’s recurrence
and which in this instance emblematizes the eradication of Alexander’s
bourgeois values. And finally, transplanting a Tarkovsky-esque house into
a whole new setting and genre, Lars von Trier’s Antichrist (2009) is, like
Nietzsche’s text from which it borrows its title, a hymn to the untamed
force of nature. It is a pronouncement of the fact that – to recall only the
film’s best-known line, which is delivered by a self-mutilating ouroboros,
a grisly embodiment of the eternal return – ‘Chaos reigns. ’
But all of that is to speak exclusively and expeditiously about
narrative figuration. What these three films – 2001, The Sacrifice, and
Antichrist – also have in common is an aesthetic commitment to
anti-humanism, which they register not only in their narratives but
also with the technical apparatus of cinema as form. Their success in
translating Nietzsche onto the screen results in a narrative anti-humanism
which, crucially in every case, is transposed into a visual style, so that
the frame itself contributes to the cancelling out of human sentimentality
and affirming, in its place, the otherworldly and immortal subjectivity of
the superhuman. In all three cases, the human subject is simultaneously
outrivaled and transformed by some terrifyingly superior force that
registers itself on the film’s technical apparatus as a revision to the
methods of motion capture – be it extra-terrestrial space, extinction of
the species, or the potency of untrammelled nature. That is what we
encounter in Kubrick’s celestial travelling shots, in Tarkovsky’s haunted
long takes, and in von Trier’s world-warping lens distortions. At a stylistic
level, these films all heighten the feeling of life precisely by eclipsing its
humanity with something far greater than itself. In that capacity, theirs
is a shared aesthetic of the sublime – but not in the quasi-votive Kantian
sense. Here we are asked to recognize, as Nietzsche did in Wagner,
‘something sublime and significant ’ that adheres between ‘the rhythm of
grand passion and in its victim, ’ between that which we are and that which
we are yet to become (1997, p. 212).
Be´la Tarr’s Final Affirmation
And this, the thwarting of humanity in the name of its own transcendence,
is precisely where the handful of biopics that attempt to dramatize the life
and times of Friedrich Nietzsche all fail to make good on his philosophy
or to actualize as real art by that philosophy’s standard. These films are
all genuflectingly committed to the human subject, that human all too
human in its manifestly stupid frailty, registering the philosopher’s story
generically as melodrama while making a fetish of his eventual descent
into madness. If, by contrast to such biopic flaccidity, a Nietzschean
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film is to affirm life both through ‘a surplus and overflow of flourishing
corporeality into the world of images and wishes, ’ and through ‘a rousing
of the animal function through images and wishes of intensified life, ’ that
film would have to transcend the human subject – the privileged figure
of all narrative cinema – and deliver visual sequences that articulate a
passage between the animals we humans were and the beings into which
we might someday evolve. Of course, this talk of humans and animals will
recall Nietzsche’s own maximally human episode, that moment in Turin
whose numerous retellings range from the political modernism of Joseph
Conrad through the incipit whimsy of Milan Kundera. It was Roland
Barthes who, when rounding out a reflection on the emotional gravity of
photographic and cinematic images, asked us to recall ‘what is dead, what
is going to die, as Nietzsche did when, as Podach tells us, on January 3,
1889, he threw himself in tears on the neck of a beaten horse: gone mad
for Pity’s sake ’ (1981, p. 34). And it is this Nietzsche, the pitiful and
pitiable lunatic, which the philosophy wants to abolish. It is also such a
view of cinema – what Laura Mulvey would call ‘death 24 times a second’
(2006, p. 15) – which the philosophy would have us recalibrate
transversely for an affirmation of life.
Be´la Tarr’s final film, The Turin Horse (A Torino´i Lo´, 2011), is not
about Nietzsche in any conventional sense but instead uses the story of his
collapse to occasion its long journey into the night. The story of Nietzsche
is given as a voice-over monologue on a black screen, as an epigraph that
bears repetition in full:
In Turin on the 3rd of January 1889, Friedrich Nietzsche steps out of the
doorway of number six, Via Carlo Albert, perhaps to take a stroll, perhaps
to go by the post office to collect his mail. Not far from him, the driver of
a hansom cab is having trouble with a stubborn horse. Despite all his urging,
the horse refuses to move, whereupon the driver - Giuseppe? Carlo? Ettore?
- loses his patience and takes his whip to it. Nietzsche comes up to the
throng and puts an end to the brutal scene caused by the driver, by this time
foaming at the mouth with rage. For the solidly built and full-moustached
gentleman suddenly jumps up to the cab and throws his arms around the
horse’s neck, sobbing. His landlord takes him home, he lies motionless and
silent for two days on a divan until he mutters the obligatory last words
‘Mutter, ich bin dumm! ’ and lives for another ten years, silent and demented,
under the care of his mother and sisters. We do not know what happened to
the horse.
While the film’s stormbound anti-narrative will subsequently stir with
a host of Nietzschean shadows whose appearances augur the end of our
species, it is the very first shot, the image onto which this epigraph opens,
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that most forcefully bespeaks an immanent film-philosophy. Everything
about the shot conveys animate and animal motility. It comprises a long
take of the beleaguered workhorse, which hales its cab and cabman down
a dirt road flanked by lifeless trees and blasted by windblown debris.
Amphoric noise doubles a threnody built in the dissonance between a
sighing string section and grinding barrel organ. The camera pulls ahead
of the horse as though driven backward by its momentum. It swoops
under the horse’s immense, black face, then pulls back out and arcs
around its body to capture gashes carved into fur and flesh; it zooms
slowly onto the cabman at the reigns, pulls back alongside the horse with
which it turns a bend, and then dollies further backward; the horse and
cab are almost lost in the glaucoma of swirling mists, but the camera
surges forward again, capturing the horse side-on and barely visible in
the darkling light: by the shot’s end, over four minutes since if began,
the horse is only a silhouette of black on grey, pulling further and further
ahead into the unknown lands of an imperceptible future, to which we
of the camera have turned our backs. There is nothing sentimental
about this opening with its refusal to indulge the falsities of sympathetic
identification. Instead, the horse serves as an avatar for the cinematic
apparatus: it shares its movement with that of the camera and is just as
much a thing of light contrast as the shot that frames it, all of which is
bound together in the unswerving actuality of the long take. ‘And it is true
that the great difficulty for us all, that which demands of us creation, is
not to discover and to understand Nietzsche. The difficulty is to know,
philosophically, how to lose him’ (2011, p. 10). This, for Badiou, is the
truth of Nietzsche. Such difficulty in loss is also what we are seeing in this
shot, while the camera looks backward toward the philosopher’s city,
a fateful site which has since vanished over the horizon and into the past.
Nevertheless, the backward glance is what allows us to apprehend the
journey forward, as though the movement of a horse and of its cinematic
double could not be seen until the human subject is transcended; as
though the combined inhumanity of the animal and its animation could
not be affirmed until Nietzsche had been left behind to his insanity on the
street of Turin.
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